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NOTES
ADMISSIBILITY OF AN OUT-OF-COURT CONFESSION:
INABILITY TO MAKE AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
OF THE DEFENDANT AS THE OUT-OF-COURT
CONFESSOR, DESPITE EXACTNESS OF NAMES AND
OTHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY,
GOES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY RATHER THAN TO THE
WEIGHT OF THE CONFESSION. Woodson v. State, 325
Md. 251, 600 A.2d 420 (1992).

INTRODUCTION

I.

Maryland courts admit hearsay into evidence if it qualifies as
an exception to the hearsay rule. l Prior to admitting hearsay evidence
under a hearsay exception, the proponent of the evidence must lay
a foundation to prove the identity of the out-of-court declarant. 2
Often, proponents of hearsay rely on circumstantial evidence to prove
identity.3 In many cases where only a name of the out-of-court
declarant is known, the presumption that "identity of names gives
rise to identity of person" (the identity presumption) is used to link
the out-of-court declarant with another individual. 4
Generally, a criminal confession is admissible if, by a preponderance of the evidence, it was made knowingly and voluntarily.s
Courts have had little occasion to address the standard of proof
required for admissibility of a hearsay confession when the identity
of the confessor is in question. Jurisdictions which have addressed
this issue generally follow the same procedure typically used to
determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence; namely that circumstantial evidence is allowed to prove the identity of the out-of-court
declarant. 6 Therefore, the identity presumption may be used as cir1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (addressing the "knowing
and voluntary" standard for admissibility of confessions); see also Clay v.
State, 211 Md. 577, 585, 128 A.2d 634, 638 (1957) (referring to the "knowing
and voluntary" standard).
6. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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cumstantial evidence to identify the out-of-court confessor. 7 After
presenting all circumstantial evidence of identity, any remaining
uncertainty as to the identity of the confessor affects only the weight
given to the confession by the jury, not its admissibility.s
In Woodson v. State,9 however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected this approach. A witness' inability to make an in-court
identification of the criminal defendant as the out-of-court confessor,
even when the witness offered other circumstantial evidence to prove
identity, resulted in the inadmissibility of the confession. lO The Wood. son court held that failure to provide sufficient evidence linking the
out-of-court confessor and the defendant on trial affects the admissibility of the confession, not merely the weight that the jury would
ultimately give the confession during deliberations. II
II.

Baltimore Law Review

FACTS

On October 10, 1989, defendant Shawn Woodson, along with
four other individuals, purchased heroin and proceeded to an apartment building where one of the individuals lived. 12 There, the group
of five snorted the heroin.13 Officer William J. Martin of the Baltimore City Police Department responded to a call regarding drug use
in a stairwell. 14 As he arrived, the group of five, including the
defendant, scattered. IS Two of the five individuals entered one of the
apartments. 16 Another individual, on his way out of the building,
encountered Officer Martin, who frisked him and let him gO.17 Of
the two individuals remaining, one was the defendant. ls The other
individual was named Taavon Hall. 19
Two backup officers, Officer Herman Brooks and Officer Robin
Johnson, responded shortly thereafter. 20 As they entered through the
rear basement door, a shot was heard, followed by a pause and two

7. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text.
9. 325 Md. 251,600 A.2d 420 (1992).
10. [d. at 262-63, 600 A.2d at 425.
11. [d.
12. [d. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

[d.
[d. at 252-53, 600 A.2d at 420-21.
[d. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421.
[d. The two individuals who entered the apartment were identified as Tyrone
McQueen and Dale Truly. Both individuals entered Truly's apartment. [d.
[d. The court identified this individual as Shawn Hawkins. [d.
[d. at 254, 600 A.2d at 421.
[d. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421.
[d. at 254, 600 A.2d at 421.
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more shots. 21 Hall then ran out the front door, while defendant
Woodson ran downstairs toward the rear door, where Officers Brooks
and Johnson stood. 22 In an exchange of gunfire between Officer
Brooks and defendant Woodson, Officer Brooks was shot in the
hand and in the chest, and Woodson was shot in the mid-groin
area. 23 Because of a bullet proof vest, Officer Brooks lived, but was
knocked down.24 As the defendant tried to escape, Officer Johnson
tripped him and apprehended him.2S Officer Martin was later found
dead on a first floor landing with twO bullets in his head. 26 A
handgun was recovered near the rear door where defendant Woodson
had tried to escape. 27 Bullets taken from both Officer Brooks and
Officer Martin matched this weapon.28
At trial, the State produced a witness, Andre Spells ,29 who
testified that .while he was in a cell in Baltimore City thirteen days
after the incident, a man who identified himself as Shawn Woodson
confessed to the crime. 30 Spells indicated that he spent two nights
and one day with this individuap· and that this cellmate had a midbody injury. 32 Moreover, this cellmate said that his nickname was
"Buddy."33 Defendant Woodson was also known as Buddy.34 Spells
also testified that his cellmate described the gun used as a .38()3s and
1993]

21. Id. Officer Brooks testified as to these facts. Id. Officer Seibert, who responded
to the call, likewise tt;stified that he heard one distinct shot, and then saw Hall
run from the apartment door. Id. The officer then heard "a couple more
shots," followed by a "few more shots." Id. Likewise, Officer Pedrick, who
also responded to the scene, testified that he heard a "loud bang" followed
by a "volley of gunshots." Id. Officer Pedrick then saw Hall run from the
front door. Id.
22.Id.
23. Id.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26 .. Id.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29. Id. at 255, 600 A.2d at 422. Evidence was introduced at trial that Spells, who
was being held on theft charges, phoned the police to offer evidence concerning
the murder of Officer Martin. Id. at 264 n.2, 600 A.2d at 426 n.2. Spells
admitted that he wanted to cooperate for his own benefit. Moreover, Spells
said he asked Woodson questions because, "I thought maybe it could help me
somewhere along the line." Id.
30. Id. at 255, 600 A.2d at 421.
31. Id. at 256, 600 A.2d at 422.
32. Id. at 258, 600 A.2d at 423.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 259, 600 A.2d at 424.
35. Id. at 259, 600 A.2d at 423. The police did recover a handgun by the rear
door where Woodson tried to escape. Id. at 254, 600 A.2d at 421. The facts
of the case, however, never identified the size of that handgun. Thus, it is not
known whether Spells' description of the gun was accurate.
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said that, if one wants to kill someone, the size of the gun is
irrelevant if the person is shot in the head. 36 In addition, Spells
testified that this cellmate said that the shooting occurred in a
hallway.37 Furthermore, it was noted that the conversation between
Spells and the individual who identified himself as Shawn Woodson
occurred approximately six and a half months prior to the trial. 38
At trial, Spells could not positively identify the defendant as the
same individual with whom he shared a jail cell some six and ~ half
months earlier. 39 Defense counsel objected to the use of Spells'
testimony on the ground that, because Spells could not identify the
defendant as the speaker, anything to which Spells testified was
hearsay evidence made outside the presence of the defendant, and
was thus inadmissible. 40 The defendant did not take the stand to
deny the identification.41 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City admitted the confession, and Woodson was found guilty of the first
degree murder of Officer Martin and sentenced to death.42 The Court
of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial on the first degree murder charge. 43
III.

BACKGROUND

In order for evidence to be admissible, it must pass numerous
legal tests, depending on the type of evidence in question. 44 When
36. Id. at 258-59, 600 A.2d at 423.
37.Id.
38. Id. at 255 n.l, 600 A.2d at 422 n.1.
39. Id. at 255, 600 A.2d at 422.
40. Id. at 257, 600 A.2d at 423.
41. Id. at 264,600 A.2d at 427. Woodson also argued for reversal of his conviction
based on the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments referring to
defendant's failure to testify, but the coup did not address the matter. Id.
42. Id. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421. Woodson was also found guilty of attempted
second-degree murder, two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of
a crime of violence and two counts of carrying a handgun. Id. The trial court
also sentenced Woodson to thirty years for the attempted second-degree murder
of Officer Brooks, to be served consecutively with a twenty year sentence for
each count of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Id.
43. Id. at 267-68, 600 A.2d at 428. On January 29, 1993, Shawn Woodson was
retried and convicted of second-degree murder and two handgun charges in
the Baltimore City Circuit Court. Jay Apperson, Woodson Guilty, Escapes
Death Penalty, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 30, 1993, at 2B. Baltimore City Circuit
Judge John C. Themelis sentenced Woodson to 53 years, to be served consecutively to a 50-year term he was serving in the wounding of Officer Brooks.
Id. A juror indicated after the trial that the jury didn't believe that the murder
was premeditated, but instead Woodson "just reacted and tried to get out of
the building." Id.
44. For example, all evidence must be relevant. E.g., Dorsey v. State, 276 Md.
638, 643, 350 A.2d 665, 669 (19765. It is '''an elementary rule that evidence,
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analyzing the admissibility of an oral hearsay confession, assuming
its relevance, the test is two-fold: The confession must meet the
admissibility requirements of an appropriate hearsay exception4S and
it must satisfy the burden of proof requirement governing the admissibility of confessions. 46
1993]

A.

Satisfying the Hearsay Requirements

An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted is hearsay. 47 Generally, testifying witnesses must be.
present at trial, administered an oath, and subjected to cross-examination. 48 The rule against hearsay was developed to assure compliance

45.
46.
47.

48.

to be admissible, must be relevant to the issues and must tend either to establish
or disprove them.''' [d. (quoting Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 585, 62
A.2d 582, 585 (1948». Moreover, the best-evidence rule requires a party to
produce the original of a document instead of a duplicate or a copy. See
generally Gray v. State, 181 Md. 439, 30 A.2d 744 (1943) (finding the rule
inapplicable to the offering of testimony that is not documentary evidence).
Secondary evidence may be received when no better evidence is obtainable.
Marvil Package Co. v. Ginther, 154 Md. 213, 220, 140 A. 95, 98 (1928). Also,
documents, in order to be admissible, must be authenticated. See Snyder v.
Stouffer, 270 Md. 647, 651-52, 313 A.2d 497, 500 (1974) (ruling that a
photostatic copy of the first page of a safe deposit "ledger contract," offered
without testimonial predicate, was inadmissible for failure to "authenticate"
and provide necessary "testimonial sponsorship"). Authentication requires that
the proponent of the evidence establish the chain of custody. See Amos v.
State, 42 Md. App. 365, 369-71, 400 A.2d 468, 471-72 (1979); 7 JOHN H.
WIOMORE, WIOMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2129 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1978);
see also Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 647, 415 A.2d 590, 597 (1980)
("Under the common law of evidence, the three critical questions for admissibility of any evidence are: 1) Is it material; 2) Is it relevant; and 3) Is it
competent? ").
See Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 210, 464 A.2d 986, 996 (1983); Vines v.
State, 285 Md. 369, 381, 402 A.2d 900, 906 (1979); Bunn v. Warden, 242 Md.
399, 400, 219 A.2d 37, 38 (1966).
See, e.g., Brittingham v. State, 63 Md. App. 164, 179, 492 A.2d 354, 361
(1985) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 440 U.S. 477, 489 (1972».
Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 6, 536 A.2d 666, 668, cert. denied, 312 Md.
602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988) (paraphrasing CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 246, at 729-30 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK 3D)); FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The Federal Rules of Evidence are in
effect in about half the states, as well as in the federal courts. CHARLES
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 (John Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK 4TH]. No state hearsay rule varies significantly from
the federal rule. [d.
See John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration oj the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 484, 484-86 (1937). See also Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), where the Court stated the following:
Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack
the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under
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with these criterion; the hearsay exclusionary rule is invoked when·
one of these "ideal conditions" is absent. 49
Even if one of the conditions is absent, however, hearsay is
nonetheless admissible as evidence if it meets the elements of one of
the "diverse exceptions to the hearsay rule. "SO Furthermore, the
hearsay evidence must be supported by sufficient indicia of reliability
and trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United StatesSI and the
Twenty-First Article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. s2 The
burden lies on the proponent of hearsay evidence to prove both
satisfaction of the hearsay elementsS3 and trustworthiness of the

49.
50.

51.

52.
53.

oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity
of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and
credibility may be assessed by the jury.
Id. at 298.
MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 245.
Tibbs v. State, 72 Md. App. 239, 246, 528 A.2d 510, 513 (1986), cert. denied,
311 Md. 286, 533 A.2d 1308 (1987); cj. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.S. 56, 66
(1980) (referring to "firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]"); see also Bailey v.
State, 327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288 (1992) (analyzing whether a letter met the
requirements of a business record and was therefore admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule); Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 578, 611 A.2d 581, 590
(1992) (determining that if a proponent of hearsay evidence "offers no suggestion of exceptions to the hearsay rule," the evidence is properly excludable);
Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611, 624, 598 A.2d 180, 186 (1991) (stating that
if one or more hearsay statements are contained within another hearsay
statement, each must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule in order to
be admissible).
Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Hearsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EVID.
802. While Rule 802 implies a general rule of exclusion with a few exceptions,
it is sometimes viewed as a general rule allowing hearsay, coupled with a
narrow exception excluding it. "In the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule
excluding hearsay is a small and lonely island." Jack B. Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 347 (1961). But see Cassidy v. State,
74 Md. App. I, 7, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988) ("Although subject to multitudinous exceptions, the [Hearsay] Rule, in its essence, is a rule of exclusion. ").
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution
requires "that in aU criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. This federal provision was not applied to the states until 1965 when the
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment made the federal confrontation clause applicable to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 u.S. 400, 403
(1965). Nearly every state has adopted a similar provision. See 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 44, § 1397. The requirement is applicable only to the accused in a
criminal prosecution. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,428-29 (1969).
See State v. Standi fur, 310 Md. 3, 5-6, 526 A.2d 955, 956 (1987).
See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. I, 8, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988).
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evidence. 54 "[T]he offeror of the hearsay statements [must] provide
the foundation upon which he asserts admissibility. "55
The admission procedure for hearsay evidence is as follows.
After hearsay evidence is offered, the trial judge "ascertains and
announces the rule of evidence law setting up the criterion of admission or exclusion. "56 Depending on the hearsay exception being
used, the proponent of the hearsay evidence is allowed to bring
forward evidence proving any preliminary facts required to be proved
under that exception.s' The opposing party offers any disputing
evidence. 58 The trial judge then makes the final determination whether
the proponent of the hearsay evidence has answered the preliminary
factual questions which must be answered in order to apply the
hearsay exception and admit the evidence. 59 If there is insufficient
evidence to support the existence of the preliminary facts, the judge
excludes the evidence. 60 If admitted, the "fact finder then gives the
1993]

54. Id. "Hearsay will be excluded, unless the proponent demonstrates its probable
trustworthiness." Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 18, 536 A.2d at 674 (1988) (quoting Deloso v. State, 37 Md. App. 101,
106-07, 376 A.2d 873, 877 (1977»; see also Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634,
653, 415 A.2d 590, 601 (1980) ("When dealing with the common law of
evidence, our predominant consideration is the accuracy of the proffered
evidence. ").
56. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, §53.
57. Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 601, 560 A.2d 1137, 1144 (1989) (citing
MCCORMICK 3D, supra note 47, § 53).
58.Id.
59. Id. at 601, 560 A.2d at 1144 (citing MCCORMICK 3D, supra note 47, § 53).
McCormick recognizes that while issues of fact are usually left to the jury,
"preliminary questions of fact upon which depends the admissibility of an item
of evidence that is objected to under an exclusionary rule of evidence" are
more properly left with the judge:
If the special question of fact were submitted to the jury when
objection was made, cumbersome and awkward problems about unanimity would be raised. If the judge admitted the evidence ... to the
jury and directed them to disregard it unless they found that the
disputed fact existed, the aim of the exclusionary rule would likely be
frustrated, for two reasons. First, the jury would often not be able
to erase the evidence from their minds, if they found that the conditioning fact did not exist. They could not if they would. Second,
the average jury would not be interested in performing this intellectual
gymnastic of "disregarding" the evidence. They are intent mainly on
reaching their verdict in a case in accord with what they believe to
be true, rather than in enforcing the long-term policies of evidence
law.
MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 53.
60. Kosmas, 316 Md. at 601, 560 A.2d at 1144. Once one can assume the existence
of a preliminary fact in question, if there is any contrary evidence, "it [is]
incumbent upon the judge to determine whether there is any true controversy
surrounding the preliminary fact," and if there is a controversy, the jury is
allowed to resolve it. Id. (citing MCCORMICK 3D, supra note 47, § 53); see
LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 104.2 (1987).
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evidence
whatever weight it deems appropriate in its preroga~
tive. "61 Ultimately, however, the trial judge has the final decision
with regard to admitting or excluding hearsay evidence. 62
When attempting to admit into evidence an oral hearsay
confession63 allegedly obtained from a criminal defendant, two hearsay exceptions are arguably available: the declaration against interest
exception64 and the admission by a party-opponent exception. 6s Although judicial opinions often fail to distinguish declarations from
admissions,66 significant differences do exist between these two hearsay exceptions.

61. Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 653, 415 A.2d 590, 600 (1980).
62. [d.
63. "[T]here is general agreement that the prosecution is entitled to introduce
confessions." MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 144. However, when the
confession is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of matters
asserted therein, it is potentially subject to exclusion under the prohibition
against hearsay. [d.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The rule defines a statement against interest as:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid
a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position. would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
[d. See also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[The] exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations
against interests is well known; no other statement is so much against interest
as a confession of murder.").
65. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). The rule defines an admission by a party-opponent
as:
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own
statement, in either an individual or representative capacity or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in
its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency of employment, made during the existence of the relationship,
. or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
[d. See a/so 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 816 ("the ground for receiving
admissions in general ... suffices' also for confessions"); JOHN M. MAGUIRE,
EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 1.02 (1982) (characterizing confessions as "a specialized
sort of admission"). Under the federal rules, an admission by a party opponent
is treated as non-hearsay. FED. R. Evm. 801 (d)(2). However, under Maryland
law, admissions are treated as an exception to the hearsay rule. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 455, 463 A.2d 822, 827-28 (1983).
66. Courts mistakenly combine the two as "admissions against interest" in judicial

1993]
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Declarations against interest include declarations against penaf
interest. 67 Admitting into evidence a declaration against interest as
an exception to the hearsay rule is "founded on the assumption that
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement that is against his own
interest."68 Thus, the statement has inherent reliability. A declaration
against interest need not be a confession, but must involve substantial
exposure to criminalliability.69 Furthermore, the out-of-court declarant must be unavailable in order to admit hearsay evidence under
the declaration against interest exception. 70 The assertion of one's
privilege not to testify renders the witness unavailable to the extent
of the scope of the privilege. 71
To be admissible, a declaration against penal interest must be
trustworthy on its face 72 and there must be no evidence of collusion. 73

67.

68.
69.

70.

71.
72.
73.

opinions. See Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582, 589,248 A.2d 455, 460 (1968)
(citing Joppy v. Hopkins, 231 Md. 52, 57, 188 A.2d 545, 548 (1963»; Hynes
v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360, 363, 128 A. 70, 71 (1925); Corbin v. Staton, 139 Md.
150, 153, ll5 A. 23, 24 (1921); but see Kekua v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 601
P.2d 364, 370 n.3 (Haw. 1979) ("The expression, 'admissions against interest,'
is a misnomer."); Hofer v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 148 N.W.2d 485, 487
(Iowa 1967) ("'admission against interest' as commonly used may often be
misleading if not erroneous").
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 296 Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822. At common law,
statements against the declarant's penal interest, e.g., statements exposing the
declarant to criminal liability, did not fall within the declaration against interest
exception. State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 10 n.2, 526 A.2d 955, 958 n.2 (1987).
Some states, including Maryland, have broadened the declaration against
interest exception to include declarations against penal interest. For a thorough
history of Maryland courts' acceptance of declarations against penal interest,
see Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 651 n.4, 415 A.2d 590, 600 n.4 (1980)
(noting that "no Maryland decision has ever overruled a trial verdict because
a declaration against penal interest was received in evidence"). For articles
addressing the declaration against penal interest exception, see Michael D.
Bergeisen, Comment, Federal Rules oj Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory
Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CAL. L. REv. ll89 (1978); Andrew R.
Keller, Comment, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Conjrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 159 (1983); Peter W. Tague, Perils oj
the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality oj Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981).
Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 204, 464 A.2d 986, 993 (1983).
Standifur, 310 Md. at 13, 526 A.2d at 960; see also United States v. Barrett,
539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.
1976).
See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
967 (1979); Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1088 (1977); FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(I); W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Claim 0/
Privilege by a Witness as Justifying the Use in Criminal Case 0/ His Testimony
Given at a Former Trial or Preliminary Examination, 45 A.L.R.2D 1354 (1956).
Zurosky, 614 F.2d at 792.
Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 643, 415 A.2d 590, 595 (1980).
Id. at 650, 415 A.2d at 599.
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The proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient evidence to fulfill
all elements of a declaration against interest exception to the hearsay
rule. 74 If the trial judge finds that the declaration against interest is
trustworthy7s and determines that all factual questions have been
sufficiently supported, the hearsay evidence will be admitted regardless of whether the case is criminal or civil, whether the plaintiff or
defendant proffers the declaration, or whether the statement is proffered for inculpatory or exculpatory purposes. 76
.
The general rule regarding admission by a party-opponent is that
an individual's words or acts may be offered against an individual
as substantive evidence of the facts admitted. 77 In such a case, "the
party cannot complain of an inability to cross-examine himself or
herself. "78 An admission is admissible as evidence regardless of
whether the out-of-court declarant is available to testify. 79 Moreover,
the out-of-court declarant "is not even required to have had firsthand
knowledge of the matter declared; the declaration may have been
self-serving when it was made; and the declarant is probably sitting
in the courtroom."so Nonetheless, "oral admissions of a party are
'universally deemed admissible' and legally sufficient to prove facts
admitted."8l
Proponents offering into evidence an admission of a partyopponent must lay the foundation for the evidence by satisfying
three conditions. 82 First, the proponent must prove that a party to

74. See supra note 67 for a definition and elements of a statement against interest.
75. The Jacobs court warned against failing to recognize the difference between
trustworthiness of the declaration versus trustworthiness of the witness who is
testifying as to the declaration:
The trustworthiness in issue . . . is the trustworthiness of the declaration, assuming it to have been made and to have been made in the
form recounted from the witness stand. The trustworthiness of the
witness who serves as the mere conduit for the out-of-court declaration
is, on the other hand, tested by other devices such as the oath and
cross-examination at the trial itself. All too frequently, we allow our
distrust of the witness on the stand to be transmuted into a mistrust
of the out-of-court declaration, and this frequently subconscious transfer serves only to blur analysis.
Jacobs, 45 Md. App. at 643 n.2, 415 A.2d at 595 n.2.
76. [d. at 643, 415 A.2d at 595-96.
77. E.g., Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582,248 A.2d 455 (1968); Terry v. O'Neal,
194 Md. 680, 72 A.2d 26 (1950).
78. McLAIN, supra note 60, § 801(4).2.
79. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 254.
80. [d.; see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 455, 463 A.2d
822, 827 (1983).
81. Branscome, 251 Md. at 589, 248 A.2d at 460 (quoting Lambros v. Coolahan,
185 Md. 463, 468, 45 A.2d 96, 98 (1945».
82. McLAIN, supra note 60, § 801(4).1.
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the action made, adopted, or authorized the statement. 83 Second, the
statement must be offered by the proponent against the speaking
party.84 Finally, the statement made must be relevant to a material
fact in the case. 8S Typically, the party against whom the admission
is being offered may rebut, contradict, explain, or deny the statement. 86
Additionally, a party attempting to admit an admission of a
party-opponent or a declaration against interest must lay a foundation
to prove the identity of the out-of-court declarant. 87 "Knowledge of
the identity of the declarant is essential to establish a proper
foundation"88 for admissibility of evidence under most of the hearsay
exceptions.
1. Use of circumstantial evidence to prove identity of an out-ofcourt declarant
When a witness cannot identify an out-of-court declarant, courts
in many jurisdictions, including Maryland, rely on circumstantial
evidence to prove identity. 89 If sufficient circumstantial evidence of
identity exists, the hearsay evidence will likely be admitted under an
exception to the hearsay rule. 90
The use of circumstantial evidence to prove identity is most
widely used in the situation of identifying a party to a: telephone
conversation. Failure to adequately identify a party to a telephone
conversation would render any statement made by that party during

83. Id.
84.Id.
85. Id.
86.Id.
87. Id. (admission by party-opponent includes showing that the statement was
made by the party).
88. United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
985 (1986) (denying admissibility of an out-of-court statement under Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), statement of a co-conspirator, because of failure to prove
identity); see also United States v. Christopher, 923 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding statement of co-conspirator inadmissible as a hearsay exception under
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) because of failure to prove identity).
89. See Bulluck v. State, 219 Md. 67, 73, 148 A.2d 433, 436 (1959); Merchant v.
State, 217 Md. 61, 70, 141 A.2d 487, 492 (1958); Spies v. State, 8 Md. App.
160, 163, 258 A.2d 758, 759 (1969); see also Christopher, 923 F.2d at 1550-51
(finding hearsay evidence inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), where
identity of out-of-court declarant "barely rises above the level of guesswork");
United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1582 (lith Cir. 1988) (finding
statements of declarant admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) where,
although witness did not know precise identity of the declarant, identity was
clear from testimony and context of out-of-court statements).
90. See supra note 89 and cases cited therein.
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the conversation inadmissible. To avoid exclusion of the evidence
as hearsay, courts require that proponents of the evidence authenticate the conversation by adequately identifying the unknown party. 92
Predominantly, proponents rely on circumstantial evidence to authenticate the conversation and admit the contents of that conversation into evidence.
Authentication basically occurs in two forms: either the testifying
witness will state that he recognized the voice of the caller or the
witness can testify to other "sundry circumstances."93 In Maryland,
these sundry circumstances can include any circumstantial evidence
400

91. See Mowen v. State, 11 Md. App. 522, 526, 275 A.2d 174, 176 (1971). In
Maryland, "[t)he generally accepted rule of evidence ... [is) that in order to
render the evidence of a telephone conversation of a witness admissible, some
preliminary testimony, either direct or circumstantial, must be presented to
establish the identity of the other person to the conversation." White v. State,
204 Md. 442, 446, 104 A.2d 810, 811 (1954) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
92. See FED. R. EVID. 901. The rule provides as follows:
Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(a) General Provisions. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: ....
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the
telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the
case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the
person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business,
the call was made to a place of business· and the conversation related
to business reasonably transacted over the telephone . . . .
[d.; see also Archer v. Stat}:, 145 Md. 128, 149, 125 A. 744, 752 (1924) (holding
that in order to admit as evidence a witness' telephone conversation, some
preliminary testimony, either direct or circumstantial, must be presented to
establish the identity of the other person to the conversation).
But see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 572,
69 A. 405, 411 (1908) (recognizing the exception to this rule in situations in
which a witness may testify as to a telephone conversation with a person who
"does not purport to be a particular person, but merely some member of the
office staff authorized to make a contract or an admission").
93. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2155; see also Knoedler v. State, 69 Md. App.
764, 773, 519 A.2d 811, 815 (1987) ("authentication can be found either from
evidence that the witness was familiar with and recognized the voice of the
alleged caller, or, in the absence of such recognition 'sundry circumstances'
(including other admissions and the like) may suffice"); Ford v. State, 11 Md.
App. 654, 657, 276 A.2d 423, 424 (1971) ("[t)he admissions contained in the
conversation are sufficient 'sundry circumstances' to authenticate the conversation").
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identifying the unknown party to the telephone conversation, such
as the testifying witness having knowledge of facts that only the
proposed speaker would know. 94 This rule is generally followed in
other jurisdictions. 9s
Authenticating a telephone conversation, however, does not require a judge to determine preliminary issues of fact, as is required
for hearsay testimony.96 Instead, "if a prima facie showing is made,
the ... statement comes in, and the ultimate question of authenticity
is left to the jury."97 Moreover, the caller's identity does not need
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 98 Any conflicts in identity
go to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility. 99
2. Use of the presumption that "identity of name gives rise to
identity of person" as circumstantial evidence to prove identity of
an individual
Courts often use the presumption that identity of name gives
rise to identity of person as circumstantial evidence to prove the
identity of an out-of-court declarant. 1oo This presumption is a rebuttable presumption lOI which "helps the prosecution to make a
prima facie case; once it has offered proof of the basic fact, the
jury may, but is not required to, infer the 'presumed' fact."102 In
the absence of any proof by the defense rebutting the presumed fact,
"such proof is sufficient to warrant the jury in finding" the presumed
facLI03
Numerous factors will either strengthen or weaken the identity
presumption.
This presumption is slight when the name is common and
there are many persons having the same name. It increases
94. See Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating
authentication can occur through a witness testifying as to "knowledge of facts
that only the speaker would be likely to know").
95. See Knoedler, 69 Md. App. at 773-74, 519 A.2d at 815 and cases cited therein.
96. See MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 227.
97.Id.
98.Id.
99. See King V. State, 560 N.E.2d 491, 494-95 (Ind. 1990) (citing Ashley V. State,
493 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. 1986); Reed V. State, 491 N.E.2d 182 (Ind. 1986».
100. See Bowers V. State, 298 Md. 115, 130-31, 468 A.2d 101, 109 (1983) (citing 1
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 103 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 13th ed. 1972»;
State V. Brown, 257 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); State V. Scriver,
580 P.2d 265,270-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); York V. State, 173 N.W.2d 693',
698-99 (Wis. 1970); see also McLAIN, supra note 60, § 303.4; 1 WHARTON,
supra, § 103; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2529.
101. A rebuttable presumption is often referred to as merely a "permissible infer, ence." MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 342.
102. McLAIN, supra note 60, § 303.2(a).
103. Wright V. State, 198 Md. 163, 171-73, 81 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1951).
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in strength with circumstances indicating the improbability
of there being two persons of the same name at the same
time and place, and where there is no evidence that there
is any other person bearing that name. Identity, then, can

be presumed from the names coupled with other circumstances .104
When analyzing an identity presumption, courts are likely to
confront two issues, both of which were addressed by the Woodson
court. lOS The court must first determine how much corroborating
evidence of identity, if any, is required to sustain the presumption
and to allow the proposed evidence to go to a jury.106 Second, if
enough corroborating evidence of identity is offered to sustain the
presumption and to allow the admissibility of the evidence, but the
presumption is rebutted by its opponent, then the court must determine whether the presumption is still allowed to go to the jury, or
whether the presumption is nullified. 1OO

104. Sallie v. State, 24 Md. App. 468, 482, 332 A.2d 316, 324 (1975) (quoting 1
WHARTON, supra note 100, § 103).
105. See infra section IV and accompanying discussion.
106. See, e.g., People v. Casey, 77 N.E.2d 812, 816-17 (III. 1948) (holding that
identity of name alone is insufficient to overcome a presumption of innocence
in a criminal case and establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v.
Curtis, 338 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. 1976) (same); State v. Ransom, 500 S.W.2d
585, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (same); State v. Livermore, 196 P. 977, 977-78
(Mont. 1921) (same); Bullard v. State, 533 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976) (same).
Compare State v. Shumate, 516 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that identity of name is sufficient to prove' identity of person) and State v.
Walls, 167 S.E.2d 547, 548 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969) (same) and State v. Kilmer,
153 N.W. 1089, 1091 (N.D. 1915) (same) and State v. Black, 42 P.2d 171,
174-77 (Or. 1935) (same) and Ex Parte Moore, 436 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968) (same) with Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460, 461 (9th
Cir. 1937) (holding that identity of name together with confirmatory facts is
sufficient to warrant an inference of identity of persons) and People v. Roy,
59 Cal. Rptr. 636, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (same) and People v. Reese, 179
N.E. 305, 307 (N.Y. 1932) (same).
107. See Commonwealth v. Middleton, 4 A.2d 533, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939); see
also State v. Mendibles, 428 P.2d 127, 129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that
when other evidence of identity conflicts with presumption, it is the jury's duty
to weigh that evidence against the presumption and any evidence that may
support the presumption to determine which, if any, preponderates); In re
Estate of Nidever, 5 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (same); State
v. Garrett, 574 P.2d 639, 641-42 (Or. 1978) (same).
Compare State v. Mitchner, 124 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. 1962) (holding that the
presumption is weak and shaken by the slightest proof of facts or showing of
circumstances which produce a doubt of identity) with Graham v. State, 224
U.S. 616,630 (1912) (citing general rule that the question of identity is ordinarily
one for the jury).
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Maryland courts have not established a clear standard regarding
the necessity of producing corroborating evidence to sustain an
identity presumption. Likewise, even assuming additional evidence is
needed to sustain the presumption, Maryland courts have not articulated a clear standard to be used in determining how much corroborating evidence is required. In some cases, Maryland courts have
indicated that the presumption can stand alone without any corroborating evidence, lOS while in other cases, Maryland courts have indicated that additional corroborative evidence is needed to sustain the
presumption. I09 In no case has the Court of Appeals of Maryland
articulated a consistent standard to be used in determining the amount
of additional evidence required to sustain the presumption. llo
For example, in Bowers v. State,lll the court of appeals affirmed
a trial court ruling that allowed presumptive evidence of an individual's identity without any corroborating evidence to go to the jury.ll2
The defendant did not provide specific rebuttal evidence, but merely
denied the sufficiency of the presumption in proving identity. 113
In Bowers, the defendant was arrested and charged with rape
and murder. ll4 During interrogation by the police, the defendant
confessed that an accomplice by the name of Alexander Peterson,
who was "on the run from Chicago," had been involved in the rape
and murder and was the one who actually strangled the victim to
death.lls The State, in rebutting defendant's claim that another
individual participated, offered evidence that someone named Alexander Peterson had been in an Illinois prison at the time of the
crime. ll6 The defendant claimed that, because there was no link
between the State's Alexander Peterson and the Alexander Peterson
in defendant's confession, the State's evidence should have been
excluded. ll7 The trial court allowed the evidence. lls
1993]

108. Bowers v. State, 298 Md. liS, 130-31, 468 A.2d 101, 109 (1983); Sallie, 24
Md. App. at 482, 332 A.2d at 324.
109. Murphy v. State, 47 Md. App. 387, 389-90, 422 A.2d 1297, 1298 (1980).
110. In Murphy v. State, discussed infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text, the
court did articulate a standard, but this standard has never been applied in
other cases discussing the identity presumption.
111. 298 Md. lIS, 468 A.2d 101 (1983)
112. It should be noted that, unlike the Woodson court, the Bowers court was not
addressing hearsay evidence. See Bowers, 298 Md. liS, 468 A.2d 101. The
Bowers court did, however, address Maryland's treatment of the identity
presumption within the context of a criminal confession. See id. Because of
these similarities, Bowers is instructive.
113. [d. at 130-31,468 A.2d at 109.
114. [d.
115. [d.
116. [d. at 131, 468 A.2d at 109.
117. [d. at 130, 468 A.2d at 109.
118. [d.
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On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The court stated that
once the State located Peterson incarcerated in Illinois, a presumption
of identity of persons arose.1l9 It then became the jurY's role to
examine the evidence and determine whether the two individuals were
the same individual referred to by the defendant. 120 "[I]t is for the
jury to pick and sift, to stress and ignore, to believe and disbelieve,
to weigh and assess, and resolve the conflicts in reaching a final
decision to acquit or convict." 121 In reaching its decision, the court
considered the fact that the name Alexander Peterson was not a
traditional name. 122 Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant
was not denied the opportunity during trial or during closing to offer
contrary evidence to disprove the prosecutor's assertion.123
In Murphy v. State,124 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
allowed presumptive evidence of identity to go to the jury, but
implied that it did so because there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence of identity to justify submission to the jury.12S The court
did not elaborate, however, on whether this circumstantial evidence
of identity was necessary for submission or whether, like Bowers,
the presumption could have stood alone. 126
In Murphy, the defendant was stopped for operating a motor
vehicle with a "loud· exhaust. "127 The defendant was unable to
produce a driver's license, and said his name was "Arvil Raymond
Murphy."12s A check of driving records with the Motor Vehicle
Administration revealed that the defendant's name was Raymond
Arvil Murphy, and that the State had revoked his operator's license
almost three months earlier. 129 On the sole basis of this record, the
defendant was convicted of driving while his license was suspended
and revoked. 130
On appeal, the defendant questioned the sufficiency of the
driving record as evidence of his identity. 131 The court of special
appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the presumption of
identity of name was sufficient to identify the defendant as the same
119. [d.
120. [d.
121. [d. (quoting Thomas v. State, 32 Md. App. 465, 477, 361 A.2d 138, 146
(1976».
122. [d. at 131,468 A.2d at 109.
123. [d.
124. 47 Md. App. 387, 422 A.2d 1297 (1980).
125. [d. at 389-90, 422 A.2d at 1298.
126. [d.
127. [d. at 388, 422 A.2d at 1297.
128. [d.
129. [d.
130. [d. at 388-89, 422 A.2d at 1297.
131. [d. at 389, 422 A.2d at 1297.
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individual named in the driving record.132 The standard for allowing
such evidence, the court stated, was that the evidence must "show
directly, or support a rational inference of, the facts to be established,
or the inference supported, beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral
certainty."133 The court found that even though the State should
have provided additional evidence linking the defendant with the
driving record (such as date of birth and residence), the driving
record contained additional information (height, weight, race, and
sex) which supplied sufficient circumstantial evidence to make the
connection 134 and meet the standard for admissibility,I3S
More recently, in McDonald v. State,136 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland addressed the use of the identity presumption and
concluded that likeness of names alone is insufficient to prove
identity.137 In McDonald, defendant Kathleen McDonald was a participant in an Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP), which monitors
the progress of individuals on probation. 138 Such monitoring included
drug testing. 139 The State attempted to revoke the defendant's probation after alleging that the defendant's urine tested positive for
cocaine. 140
In attempting to prove that the defendant used cocaine, the
State tried to introduce into evidence two positive laboratory urinalysis reports bearing the name Kathleen McDonald, reports which the
defendant denied were applicable to her. 141 To prove that the samples
came from the defendant, the State produced testimony from two
witnesses. First, a witness from ASP spoke of her knowledge of
ASP's records, which contained copies of the laboratory reports. 142
Second, a technician from Maryland Medical Laboratories, Inc.
(MML), which performs analysis of ASP urine samples, testified as
to the process used in identifying and testing samples. 143 The MML
technician had not performed analysis on any of the samples in
question. l44 The MML technician testified that MML employees collect the samples from ASP and deliver them to the MML laboratory,
132. [d. at 389-90, 422 A.2d at 1298.
133. [d. at 389, 422 A.2d at 1298 (quoting Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 237, 151
A.2d 898, 901 (1959».
134. [d. at 389-90, 422 A.2d at 1298.
135. [d.
136. 314 Md. 271, 550 A.2d 696 (1988).
137. /d. at 281-82, 550 A.2d at 701.
138. [d. at 278, 550 A.2d at 699.
139. /d.
140. /d.
141. [d. at 278-79, 550 A.2d at 699-700.
142. [d.
143. [d. at 279, 550 A.2d at 699.
144. [d. at 278-79, 550 A.2d at 699.
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where the sample is assigned an identification number consisting of
six digits}4s When a sample tests positive upon an initial screening, 146
the sample is then tested twice more using two more sophisticated
procedures. 147 At each testing, technicians confirm the name on the
sample. 148 The MML technician likewise testified that based on information contained in the worksheet, screening record and the final
analysis report for the samples in question, "normal procedures were
followed in each instance." 149
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County ruled that the evidence
was admissible, despite the fact that the State did not produce the
lab technicians who tested the urine. ISO The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed, holding that the State failed to establish a chain
of custodylSI because it failed to offer evidence that a Kathleen
McDonald ever gave urine samples to ASP, failed to explain how
the samples were delivered to the MML courier, and failed to offer
evidence on how ASP obtained, labeled, and stored the urine samples. 1S2 "We have nothing more than the delivery ... of urine samples
labelled with the not uncommon name of Kathleen McDonald and
the subsequent processing of those samples. That is simply not enough
to authenticate the urine samples with the requisite degree of certainty." IS3

B.

Burden of Proof for Confessions
A confession to a crime is "a particular kind of admission,
governed by special rules"ls4 significantly different from the rules
145. [d.
146. The initial screening procedure is called "Thin Layer Chromatography." [d.
at 279, 550 A.2d at 700.
147. Positive results are "confirmed by the more specific Enzyme Multiple Immunoassay Technique and then by Gas Chromatography." [d.
148. [d.
149. [d.
150. [d. at 278, 550 A.2d at 699.
151. [d. at 281, 550 A.2e1 at 700. "[T]he State must establish the chain of custodythat is a basic step in authenticating the evidence prior to its admission. It
failed to do so here." [d. (citations omitted).
152. [d. at 281, 550 A.2d at 701.
153. [d. (citing Unigard Ins. Co. v. Elmore, 224 S.E.2d 762, 763 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976) (holding that blood alcohol test results were inadmissible where there
was no showing that a blood sample was ever taken from decedent); Priest v.
McConnell, 363 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Neb. 1985) (holding that chemical analysis
of urine samples was inadmissible where plaintiff failed to establish how or
where the urine sample was taken from defendant); Newton v. City of Richmond, 96 S.E.2d 775, 778-80 (Va. 1957) (holding that results of blood alcohol
tests were inadmissible where evidentiary foundation showed only that vial of
blood tested bore accused's name».
154. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 262.
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governing the admissibility of admissions of a party-opponent. While
an admission entails only acknowledging facts tending to prove guilt
but failing to establish all essential elements of the crime,lss a
confession is a statement admitting all facts required to sustain a
conviction of a particular crime. IS6 Because a confession admits every
element of a case and is ordinarily given overwhelming weight by
the jury, courts necessarily take precautions to avoid the prejudicial
effect of untrustworthy confessions.
One such precaution is embodied in the knowing and voluntary
standard. Typically, a confession is admissible if, by a preponderance
of the evidence, it was made knowingly and voluntarily.ls7 The judge,
not the jury, determines whether the confession meets this burden. ISS
Courts have had little occasion to address the admissibility of a
criminal confession when doubt exists as to whether the confessor
and the defendant are the same person; that is, when the identity of
the confessor is in question at trial. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has made clear that the heightened burden of proof
in criminal cases (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) applies to the
establishment of facts underlying the conviction, not to the admissibility of a confession offered to prove these facts.1S9 "[T]he admis-

155. See Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318, 193 A.2d 40 (1963). In Stewart, the court
stated that
[a] confession is a species of admission, that is to say, an admission
that says or necessarily implies that the matter confessed constitutes
a crime. An admission which is not a confession is an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstance which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize conviction but which tends to establish the ultimate fact
of guilt.
Id. at 323, 193 A.2d at 43; see also Merchant v. State, 217 Md. 61, 69, 141
A.2d 487, 491 (1958) (labelling the difference between a confession and an
admission a "clear distinction"); State v. Hallam, 575 P.2d 55, 62 (Mont.
1978) ("an 'admission' concerns only some specific fact which, in turn, tends
to establish guilt or some element of the offense") ..
156. See Stewart, 232 Md. at 323, 193 A.2d at 43; see also State v. Schomaker,
303 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Iowa 1981) ("confession is an acknowledgment in express
terms by a party in a criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged"); Hallam,
575 P.2d at 62 ("A 'confession' is an admission of crime itself.").
157. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
158. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963).
159. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). In Lego, the Court stated that the
heightened burden of proof in criminal cases, that is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, applies to the establishment of facts underlying the conviction, not to
the admissibility of specific pieces of evidence offered to prove these facts. Id.
at 486-87. The Court allowed a confession to be admissible even though its
voluntariness was only proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 487.
The Court held that a reasonable doubt standard was not offended "because
the admissibility of a confession is determined by a less stringent standard."
Id.

a
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sibility of a confession is determined by a less stringent standard. "160
Although not addressing confessions specifically, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, in Woodell v. State,161 held that "evidence
need not be positively connected with the accused" to be admissible,
but instead, evidence is admissible when "there is a probability of
its connection with the accused for the crime, the lack of positive
identification affecting the weight of the evidence, rather than its
admissibility." 162
When specifically addressing the admissibility of confessions not
positively linked to the defendant, courts outside Maryland have
typically permitted the admissibility of the evidence. When there is
a probability of a connection with the defendant, the confession is
admitted and any uncertainty of identity goes to the weight the jury
should place on the confession, and not to its admissibility.
For example, in State v. Scriver,163 the Court of Appeals of
Washington held that uncertainty as to the identity of the out-ofcourt confessor goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.l64 In Scriver, the defendant was arrested for shoplifting and
possession of a controlled substance. 165 The store detective identified
the defendant and gave the police officer her name: Carla Jean
Engeseth. l66 Thereafter, the defendant, who was arrested as Carla
Jean Engeseth, visited the office of her attorney for the purpose of
making and signing a confession. 167 A notary public and legal secretary of the defendant's attorney listened to and typed the confession, which the defendant then signed as "Carla J. Scriver." 168 Prior
to trial, all drugs found in defendant's purse on the day of her arrest
had been erroneously destroyed. 169
At trial, neither the store detective, the arresting officer, nor the
notary public could positively identify the defendant as the same
individual who was arrested or who made and signed a confession. 170
The notary public who typed and notarized the confession testified
that the person who filled out the confession signed the confession
as "Carla J. Scriver" and responded to "Ms. Scriver."l7l The defendant objected to the admission of the confession as hearsay
160. [d. at 487.

161. 2 Md. App. 433, 234 A.2d 890 (1967).
162. [d. at 436, 234 A.2d at 892.

163. 580 P.2d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
164. [d. at 271 (citing State v. Spadoni; 243 P. 854, 857 (Wash. 1926».
165. [d. at 266.
166. [d.
167. [d.
168. [d. at 267.
169. fd.
170. [d.
171. [d. at 270.
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evidence 172 and denied any connection between her and the confession. 173 The trial court admitted the confession.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed,
holding that uncertainty as to the defendant's identity goes only to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 174
[C]ertainly [the confession] has some bearing on the question
whether the accused was guilty of the crime to show that
the person committing it was of his general appearance, or
to show that a person of his general appearance was seen
in the vicinity of the place of the crime immediately prior
to its commission. 17s
The court held that the existence of the confession and the statements
therein were proof of the elements of the crime and were properly
admitted. 176
Similarly, in Fischer v. State,177 the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas held admissible a confession made to a police officer,
despite the fact that the police officer could not identify the defendant
at trial as the same individual who made the confession. 178 In Fischer,
-the defendant was convicted of sending an anonymous letter .179
Although the police officer who took the defendant's confession was
unable to identify defendant at trial, the police officer did indicate
that the one who confessed was named Estil Harlan Fischer, which
matched the defendant's name. ISO The defendant objected to the
admission of the confession. 181 The trial court admitted the confession
and the appeals court affirmed. 182 The appeals court stated that the
other evidence, establishing that it was the defendant who was taken
to the police officer's office on the night of his arrest, was sufficient
to establish that it was the defendant who confessed to the officer.183

172. [d. at 268. Defendant also claimed, because the drugs had been destroyed, that
there was no showing of relevancy of the confession. [d.
173. [d. at 269-70.
174. [d. at 271 (citing State v. Spadoni, 243 P. 854, 857 (Wash. 1926».
175. [d. (quoting Spadoni, 243 P. at 857).
176. [d. at 271.
177. 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tx. Crim. App. 1962).
178. [d. at 398. The Fischer court did not address the identity of names presumption.
However, even if the court had -done so, it is likely the court would have
reached the same result. Because the defendant in Fischer did not testify or
offer any evidence in his defense, he did nothing to rebut the presumption.
See id. at 397.
179. Id. at 396.
180. Id. at 398.
181. [d. at 397.
182. [d. at 397-98.
183. [d. at 398.
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Finally, in York v. State,184 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
likewise affirmed a trial court's admission of a confession when only
circumstantial and presumptive evidence linked the identity of the
confessor with the defendant. 18S In York, the defendant was convicted
of burglary. 186 A detective testified that a man with the same name
as the defendant confessed to him at 10 a.m., on March 22, 1968,
but the detective was unable to identify the defendant at trial as the
same individual who confessed .187 The defendant objected to the
admission of the confession, claiming it was "hearsay and selfserving." 188' The trial court admitted the confession and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed. 189 In finding the confession admissible,
Wisconsin's highest court looked to circumstantial evidence of the
confessor's identity that linked him to the defendant. l90 For example,
the State offered corroborating testimony by another detective, confirming that he had seen the police officer who took the confession
questioning the defendant at 10 a.m., on March 22, 1968. 191
IV.

THE INSTANT CASE

The court in Woodson began its analysis by stating that, prior
to admitting a confession, there must be sufficient indicia that the
confession was made by the defendant. l92 The State bears this burden
of proving identity.193 In Woodson, the court found that the State
failed to meet this burden primarily because the State failed to
produce any records to establish that Woodson and Spells were ever
held in the same cell. l94 Such evidence could have come in the form
of jail records or testimony from guards or other individuals who
may have seen Woodson and Spells in jail together .195
The court recognized that the State produced some corroborating
evidence, such as the fact that Spells knew Woodson's nickname and
that Woodson had a mid-body injury, but that evidence alone was
not sufficient to establish identity.l96 The court distinguished both
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970).
[d. at 695.
[d.
[d. at 698-99.
[d. at 699.
[d.
[d. at 698-99.
[d. at 699.
Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 260-61,600 A.2d 420, 424 (1992).
[d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 424.
[d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 425.
[d.
[d. at 263, 600 A.2d at 425. The court stated that
[i]n this capitol prosecution, Spells's [sic] testimony concerning Wood-
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York v. State l97 and Fischer v. State,198 on grounds that the proponents of those confessions introduced sufficient evidence to establish
the identity of the defendant as the individual who confessed. l99
In addressing the presumption that "identity of name gives rise
to identity of person," the court stated that, even if the use of
Woodson's name by Spells' cellmate raised a rebuttable presumption,
that presumption was nullified when Spells failed to identify the
defendant at trial as the same individual.200 In effect, the inability of
the witness to identify the defendant as being the out-of-court declarant goes to the admissibility of the evidence and not to the weight
that it should be given by the jury. The confession would only be
admissible if the State made a prima facie showing that Spells'
cellmate was Woodson, which the State failed to do. 201

v.

ANALYSIS

The court's ruling in Woodson puts Maryland in the minority
of jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue. The opinion, however,
seems to emphasize the persuasive effect that confessions have on
juries and places a much greater burden on the State when attempting
to admit a hearsay confession when the identity of the confessor is
uncertain.
The court's analysis, however, ·is not without criticism, most
notably in its dissenting opinion. 202 The dissent criticized the height-

197.
198.
199.

200.
201.
202.

son's confession, if admitted and believed ... [would make) Woodson
. . . eligible for the imposition of the death penalty . . . . In these
circumstances, we think an evidentiary foundation beyond Spells's
[sic) knowledge of Woodson's name was essential to show a linkage
between the two men and the purported confession.
[d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 425 (emphasis added). The court leaves one begging
the question whether the fact that this was a death penalty proceeding heightened the evidentiary requirements, or whether, had the case been only a
misdemeanor, more relaxed indicia of identity would have been sufficient.
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Woodson did not distinguish either
Murphy v. State, 47 Md. App. 387, 422 A.2d 1297 (1980) or Sallie v. State,
24 Md. App. 468, 332 A.2d 316 (1975), in which the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland allowed evidence of identity based on the identity presumption
and other circumstantial evidence, to be submitted to the jury. See supra notes
124-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Murphy.
173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970).
361 S.W.2d 395 (Tx. Crim. App. 1962).
Woodson, 325 Md. at 261-62, 600 A.2d at 425. The court recognized the
possibility that the State decided not to produce more evidence linking Spells
and Woodson only after the trial court announced its decision to admit the
confession. [d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 425.
[d. at 263-64, 600 A.2d at 426.
[d. at 264, 600 A.2d at 426.
[d. at 268, 600 A.2d at 428 (Karwacki, J., dissenting).
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ened standard the majority placed on the admissibility of confessions.
Because the standard of proof for the admissibility of evidence is
one of preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the proper test for admissibility of the confession is "whether
the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that it was
more likely than not that the defendant was the man who spoke to
Spells on those occasions. "203 According to the dissent, the circumstantial evidence of identity provided "a sufficient basis for the
admission Of those oral admissions despite Spells' inability to identify
Woodson at trial. "204
Moreover, the majority opinion appears to remove from the jury
what was once within their purview. Traditionally, once the identity
presumption arose, it was the jury's duty "to pick and sift, to stress
and ignore, to believe and disbelieve, to weigh and assess, and resolve
the conflicts in reaching a final decision. " lOS The dissent noted that
the identity presumption was sufficiently supported by circumstantial
evidence when considering that the name "Shawn Woodson" is not
common, that Spells knew Woodson's nickname, and that Spells
knew Woodson had a mid-body injury.206 As such, "it was for the
jury to determine the weight to be accorded that inference."207
Likewise, the majority opinion did not address the significance
of the defendant's failure to present any evidence to rebut the identity
presumption, which Woodson could have done during the trial or
during closing arguments. In Bowers, for example, the court allowed
an identity presumption to go to the jury partly because the defendant
"was not denied the opportunity to offer contrary· evidence to
disprove the State's assertion."208 Other than the fact that Spells
could not identify Woodson as the same man as his cellmate, the
fact that the defendant did not actively present evidence rebutting
the State's assertion did not appear to be a factor in the Woodson
analysis.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the court's obvious concern with
the fact that Woodson wa.s a death penalty case changed the analysis
for admitting hearsay confessions. 209 Although the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland has allowed an identity presumption to go to
the jury for less severe offenses,210 the Woodson court neither addressed nor distinguished those cases.
203. [d. at 269, 600 A.2d at 428.
204. [d. at 269, 600 A.2d at 428-29.
205. [d. at 270, 600 A.2d at 429 (quoting Thomas v. State, 32 Md. App. 465, 477,
361 A.2d 138, 146 (1976».
206. [d. at 271, 600 A.2d at 429-30.
207. [d. at 271, 600 A.2d at 430.
208. Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 131,468 A.2d 101, 109 (1983).
209. See supra note 196.
210. See Murphy v. State, 47 Md. App. 387, 422 A.2d 1297 (1980); Sallie v. State,
24 Md. App. 468, 332 A.2d 316 (1975).
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Finally, the Woodson court specifically noted that sufficient
proof is required to link the defendant with the confessor before a
hearsay confession is admissible, but it failed to elaborate on the
quantity of evidence required to sufficiently establish identity. The
court only stated that because the State failed to offer evidence that
Spells and Woodson were cellmates, it did not meet its burden of
establishing identity. Only a prima facie showing of identity would
,have been sufficient. 2I1 The court in Woodson leaves open the question of whether, had the State offered evidence confirming that Spells
and Woodson were cellmates, the presumption would still be nullified
by Spells' inability to identify Woodson.
VI.

IMPACTIRAMIFICATION

The holding in Woodson is very narrow, specifically limited to
cases involving both identity presumptions and oral hearsay confessions. It is unlikely that the court's treatment of the identity presumption in Woodson will apply to those factual situations not
involving confessions. However, the holding in Woodson undoubtedly
places a greater burden on the State in introducing hearsay confessions. This burden is magnified when the delay between the giving
of the confession and the trial is great enough such that memories
fade and those who heard the confession are no longer able to
recognize the defendant as the confessor.
It is likely that, had the State in Woodson offered evidence that
Spells and Woodson were cellmates, the fact that Spells could not
identify Woodson as the out-of-court confessor would not have
nullified the presumption. The same would probably hold true if
Spells had made an in-court identification of Woodson, even if the
State had not offered evidence that the two were cellmates. What
the Woodson decision requires, therefore, at least when dealing with
confessions and identity presumptions, is not so much sufficient
circumstantial evidence of the identity of the out-of-court confessor,
but some evidence connecting the testifying witness with the out-ofcourt confessor. This evidence must be independent of the testimony
provided by the testifying witness.
'
VII.

CONCLUSION

Maryland is in the minority of jurisdictions in holding that the
inability to make an in-court identification of the defendant as an
out-of-court confessor, despite exactness of names and other circumstantial evidence of identity, goes to the admissibility rather than to
the weight of the evidence. Although it is probable that Maryland
211. Woodson, 325 Md. at 264, 600 A.2d at 426.
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courts would allow the admissibility of a confession despite an
inability to make an in-court identification as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence of identity exists, it is not clear exactly what
constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity. Whereas
identity of those involved in only minor offenses can be established
by the identity presumption corroborated by circumstantial evidence,
it is not clear whether increased evidence of identity is required in
death penalty cases. No clear test has been articulated in the cases
addressing these issues, making the issues ripe for decision.
Roberta C. Sino pole

